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The Spectre of Neoliberalism: 
Thanatonomics and the Possibility of Trans-Individualism 
 
I 
 
What is Austerity? 
 
In this article I want to explore the psycho-politics of austerity in the context of 
neoliberal capitalism with particular reference to the British case, which I take to be 
the home of early liberalism and industrial capitalism and the contemporary site of 
what I want to call neoliberal thanatonomics, or the approach to political economy 
that mixes unsustainable levels of austerity and poverty with similarly excessive 
forms of luxury and consumption. Although neoliberal capitalism is considered a 
political, economic, form defined by its utilitarian rationality, pragmatism, and 
commitment to the bottom line, I want to suggest that this mode of capitalism is also 
organised around a kind of hyper-moralism, which is ultimately theological in origin 
and quasi-theological in practice. Given this cultural, quasi-theological, political 
economy, I suggest that Britain, Europe, and essentially capitalism more broadly, is 
in the process of sliding back towards a new Victorianism, defined by hyper-division 
and hyper-inequality. Under these conditions, my thesis is that the current post-crash 
settlement, which suggests that austerity and hyper-inequality is a kind of temporary 
fix, will quickly become unsustainable. At this point, the neoliberal commitment to the 
realism of base materialism will begin to tip over in a new political idealism able to 
recognise the necessity of the social relationship between self and other and the 
ecological interdependence between self, other, and world that is currently prohibited 
3 
 
by a combination of economic realism, post-political individualism, and a broader 
historical repression of the necessity of being-together-in-the-world. However, I 
suggest that in order to reach this point where the truth of what Gilbert Simondon 
(Combes, 2012) called trans-individualism can be realised, the left will need to 
confront and pass through what I explore through the idea of the ‘resistance to social 
analysis’ that has resulted from the traumatic breaks of first, modern liberal, and 
second, post-modern neoliberal capitalism. In order to conclude I argue that this 
confrontation, and ‘working through’, will ultimately be made possible by the 
contemporary thanatonomic model of economics which continues to produce 
unsustainable levels of inequality, austerity, poverty, luxury, and wealth. On this 
basis of the re-emergence of a new class politics based in a popular recognition of 
vast inequality and injustice my claim is that the current spirit of neoliberal capitalism 
that seeks to legitimate division on the basis of the moral superiority of the super-rich 
will eventually give way to its demonic other, the spectre of neoliberalism, that 
suggests the possibility of a general economics of social identity, trans-individualism, 
and what Georges Bataille (1991) wrote about in terms of continuous being. 
However, before exploring the psycho-politics of thanatonomics and moving beyond 
this to think through the possibilities of working through the repressive resistance to 
social analysis, I want to turn to the condition of austerity and then open out onto a 
broader exploration of the inequality and injustice of contemporary, or what we might 
correctly call, late capitalism. 
 
Like much of Europe, since 2008, and certainly since 2010, the British social,  
political, economic, and cultural landscape has been defined by the idea of austerity. 
In this context austerity refers to a material, economic, condition determined by the 
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logic of the cut. According to this logic, which was the policy motor of the Cameron-
Osborne Conservative government, public spending must be reduced in the name of 
a minimal welfare state and what Cameron famously called ‘the big society’ where 
people effectively live beyond the state and no longer rely on central government to 
organise their lives. Given this push to reduce state spending and state interference, 
public institutions, such as the social security state, education, and health, must 
shrink, and have shrunk, or have been reorganised so that they are more cost 
effective. The purpose of this drive for efficiency is to purge state-run institutions of 
non-productive waste. Exposure to the logic of the market is key here because 
competition ensures that waste and ‘running in the red’ is entirely unsustainable. 
However, the problem with this austere drive to cut spending is that it appears 
unsuitable to respond to the economic, never mind social problems caused by the 
crash and subsequent recession which set in in the wake of the state bank bail outs. 
As Mark Blyth (2013) notes in his book, Austerity, harsh cuts in state spending 
cannot produce growth in order to lift an economy out of recession because saving 
and, beyond this, the investment required to produce growth rely on spending in 
order to first, generate money which can be saved and second, increase confidence 
to stimulate investment. For Blyth the policy of austerity is therefore economically 
utopian in the sense that its core idea is simply unrealistic. In his view the 
assumption that cuts will balance the books, continue to produce growth, and not 
produce a spiral of recession and decline is unfounded, unsustainable, and based in 
a kind of individualised economic common sense.  
 
However, this is not to say that the champions of austerity are naïve because this is 
clearly not the case, and in pointing out their lack of long term economic realism 
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what Blyth tends to underplay in his book is the neoliberal elite’s particular brand of 
political utopianism which relies on an alternative vision of the objectives of 
economic production. The core idea of this political utopianism, which I would 
suggest it is possible to observe in the British case, resides in a vision of the 
reorganisation of class society and the construction of a kind of post-modern 
Victorianism that recalls Disraeli’s (2008) idea of the two nations. According to this 
new neoliberal utopian vision, austerity is absolutely not a temporary fix, concerned 
to address state over-spend and balance the books in order to create the conditions 
for sustainable growth and the improvement of living standards across the board, but 
rather a permanent condition organised around the recognition that growth, 
spending, and improvement cannot be for everybody, if capitalists are to continue to 
extract extreme levels of surplus profit from the production process. While 
Europeans and, in this particular case, the British live with the language of austerity 
now, it may be the case that this feeling of living under pressure and of not being 
able to access necessary public goods such as healthcare and education which it is 
assumed should be available to everybody, will vanish in the austere future when 
austerity is no longer thought about in terms of a short-term response to crash, 
recession, and a discourse of state over-spend, but has instead become normalised 
and entirely accepted by a class society that cannot speak its name or recognise the 
injustice of hyper-division and hyper-inequality. The first and perhaps critical moment 
of the implementation of this neoliberal utopian vision in the British case, but also in 
the European context, came when the financial crash was transformed from a 
problem generated by the over-leveraging of banks that had adopted a philosophy of 
riskless risk around securitised lending into a crisis of public spending and the over-
reach of the state, and particularly the welfare state, into the lives of its citizens. 
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There is no doubt that state over-reach was, and remains, a problem but this is 
certainly not an issue around public spending and welfare. On the contrary, this 
issue of over-reach was and is absolutely concerned with state intervention in, or 
more accurately the attachment to, the agendas of business and finance concerned 
with the production of excessive levels of surplus value that never trickle down 
through the class system.  
 
On the basis of this attachment and identification, Blyth (2013) explains that this first 
moment of what I am writing about in terms of the neoliberal utopian vision of a new 
Victorianism entailed the discursive sleight of hand that saw a problem of financial 
irresponsibility become an issue of public over-spend on apparently unproductive 
welfare and civic goods, such as health and education. Following this claim, Blyth 
makes the point that the effect of this discursive sleight of hand was to transfer the 
cost of the private sector bank bailout, which in the British case amounted to over 
£140 billion, to the public sector that was then required to absorb the cost of this 
transfer of state funds into private hands. But beyond the short term need to balance 
the books and absorb the costs of the bail out, it is clear that the crash, crisis, and 
subsequent recession presented the neoliberal elites with an opportunity to 
reconstruct social and economic relations and employ the kinds of shock tactics set 
out by Naomi Klein (2007) in her now classic, The Shock Doctrine, to pursue utopian 
political ends. In this case the crash, and related discursive transfer of responsibility 
for financial meltdown from banks to welfare, enabled the neoliberal elite to minimise 
state responsibility for the welfare of the social body and open up new spaces for 
private sector investment and ultimately exploitation of a population which, in the 
British case at least, was largely responsive to the message that the crash, crisis, 
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and recession was the result of state overspend on the undeserving poor. Although 
the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition which imposed austerity in Britain from 
2010 to 2015 suggested that ‘belt tightening’ was universal and that everybody was 
part of this exercise, it is hard to miss the class based politics of this apparently 
purely economic policy. Contrary to the Conservative line that ‘we’re all this 
together’, the political impact of the class based dimension of what we might call 
uneven austerity in Britain has been to first, drive vast numbers of people (low 
earners, the unemployed, single parents, the disabled, and the disadvantaged) into 
poverty making them fit for exploitation by business looking to suppress wages and 
second, leave the business elites and super rich free to make and spend money with 
wild abandon.  
 
While there is certainly economic growth in this scenario, this is not the kind of 
growth imagined by Keynes or Keynesians who ultimately thought that growth and 
economic expansion should result in improvement in the lives of the population 
across the board. On the contrary, this is the kind of growth that Marx (1990) 
observed in the 19th century and associated with the practice of unlimited exploitation 
that drove the working classes and lower orders into a state of poverty on the very 
edge of existence. Although it would be hard to sell a policy of uneven austerity, 
even to the British who understand class inequality in terms of a kind of feudal social 
contract between bosses and workers, because notions of meritocracy and the right 
to consume are deep rooted in neoliberal society, the neoliberal elites have sought to 
justify the logic of the public sector cut through the ordoliberal vision of order and 
stability. In other words, the basic message of austerity is that the books must be 
made to balance. In this context Greece has become a symbol of the problem of 
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Keynesian state over-spend, when it is in actual fact a reflection of neoliberal hubris 
based in normalised corruption, tax evasion, and centrally a belief that there is no 
end to the wealth that the rich can accumulate in the context of monetary union 
designed to create a Europe wide frictionless free market. In the wake of the 
American financial crash, which quickly spread to the Euro zone, it became 
impossible to manage the Greek debt burden in a situation where monetary union 
means taking a hit for others, rather than making a profit from their labour, primarily 
because Greece’s EU partners were, and remain, unwilling to support their partners. 
As a result the problem of Greek debt remains, even in the wake of the most recent 
EU bail out of July, 2015, and it difficult to see how Greece will ever escape a state 
of indebtedness. While Syriza has sought to defend the right of the Greek people to 
a decent life, the objective of the Euro zone leaders has been to provide loans to 
enable the Greeks to repay investors in exchange for the imposition of draconian 
austerity measures designed to retrofit Greece for a future of neoliberal super-
exploitation. In the current political situation, Greece remains a kind of limit case of 
austerity, and a symbol for the reason austerity must be imposed in a situation where 
it is impossible to conceive that investors should take a hit in order to avert a socio-
economic humanitarian crisis.  
 
The reason it has become unthinkable to write off the Greek debt, and the reason 
private investment is considered untouchable, is essentially political in the sense that 
the neoliberal elites stubbornly refuse to consider loses when they can shift 
responsibility and costs onto the wider social body that they believe should pay for 
their exorbitant privilege. However, there is also a clear cultural and philosophical 
history that means that it makes sense to the wider population, especially in the case 
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of Britain which gave birth of liberalism, to reduce state spend and defend private 
property rights to the very end. It is to this cultural history that I now turn. According 
to Blyth (2013), the history of austerity starts with John Locke’s (2003) work on role 
of government, which captures the neoliberal ambivalence towards the state that is 
on the one hand a dangerous institution that costs too much and always threatens 
the liberty of free men, but on the other hand remains a necessity required to defend 
private property rights. While this view more or less defines the contemporary 
neoliberal attitude to the state, which should create the conditions or, in the language 
of the German ordoliberals, the framework for the market to operate, it also reflects 
the classical liberal anxiety about state spending and centrally state debt that it is 
possible to find in the writings of Hume and Smith and that has re-emerged in the 
wake of the crash. Against Keynes (1965), who thought that the state should 
organise capitalism in the name of the social body, the contemporary neoliberal 
vision of the state represents a fusion of the ordoliberal theory concerned with state 
responsibility for market order and competition and the laissez faire fear of big 
government and later, in the work of Hayek, the phobia of totalitarianism. From the 
latter perspective, which is most clearly represented by Hayek’s (2001) The Road to 
Serfdom, it is absolutely essential that the state does not overstep the mark and 
meddle in the market. In Hayek’s view the Keynesian ‘tax and spend’ welfare state 
was already well on the road to totalitarianism and he did not hold out much hope 
that this dystopia could ever be averted because the progress towards the all-
encompassing Weberian iron cage seemed unstoppable.  
 
While Blyth (2013) starts his history with Locke, the historian Florian Schui (2014) 
projects the origins of the idea of austerity back further than liberal concerns about 
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the state and public over-spend, and in a sense deepens the idea of the west’s 
cultural attachment to the notion of the austere life. In his view it is possible to trace 
the history of Smith’s idea of frugality back to Greece, Aristotle, and what we might 
call the body economic where moderation is the key to the good life. Although it is 
hard to understand how this sentiment, which is essentially the cultural progenitor of 
the theory of economic austerity, survives in the contemporary period characterised 
by an obsession with consumption and excess, Schui’s history shows that Aristotle’s 
vision is deeply embedded in western culture, where it influenced Roman stoicism 
and the work of Seneca, Christianity where the welfare of the soul requires that the 
true believer resists the temptations of the flesh that know no limits, through to 
contemporary populist movements around well-being and happiness in moderation. 
Indeed, it was only much later in modern Europe, when thinkers such as Hobbes 
(2008) and Mandeville (1989) began the challenge the wisdom of the ancients, that 
philosophers and political theorists started to understand the gap between the 
behaviour of the individual and society and recognise that the ancient political 
psychology of the micro / macrocosm where the individual is a reflection of civic life, 
which is in turn a reflection of cosmic processes no longer necessarily held. While 
Hobbes saw that the natural instincts of men needed to be subsumed in the political 
society of the leviathan able to maintain order, Mandeville explained that private 
vices could produce public virtue and reached the conclusion that a prosperous 
society defined by wickedness was in the end a better option than a poor, but 
virtuous community. But if Mandeville saw the value of or perhaps even good in 
selfishness, Schui shows how the works of classical liberals such as Smith (2010, 
2012) and Weber (2010) were essential to move this new macroeconomic theory 
towards the logic of capital and capitalism, primarily because they recognised that 
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selfish accumulation is in itself not enough to generate economic growth and that 
what is required is a sense of frugality, abstinence, and a moral commitment to work 
able to create a tendency to investment and reinvestment.  
 
Thus Schui (2014) explains that both Smith and Weber imagined the moral or 
virtuous capitalist who made money and invested capital on the basis of theological 
belief in the basic goodness of hard work and economy. In other words, what they 
achieved was to square the circle of ancient moderation, balance, and stasis and 
modern vice, dynamism, and change and show how economic growth was made 
possible precisely by the austere worldview. This view of the morality of the market 
was, of course, contested by Marx (1990), who saw the class basis of the production 
process, and the violence required to generate surplus value, and later Keynes 
(1965) who wanted to put the market to work for the good of everybody in the name 
of a more equal society. But the apparent failure of this social democratic approach 
that dominated from the great depression through to the 1970s, which saw the 
emergence of a kind of flat line economy defined by low growth, high unemployment, 
and inflation, brought the moral vision of the superiority of the efficient market 
relative to the bloated state back into focus. According to Hayek (2001), the problem 
with the Keynesian state was that it spent too much and essentially discouraged 
saving meaning that the cost of private lending became prohibitive. As interest rates 
increased investment levels decreased with the result that economic growth slowed, 
unemployment rates began to climb, and the global economy continued to slide 
towards recession. In the face of this situation the neoliberal response was to cut 
back state spending, privatise industry, and deregulate labour in order to cut costs 
and create a more competitive market situation. While this approach offered an 
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economic response to Keynes, it centrally also worked on the basis of a moral 
critique of the dependent, infantilised, statist man who needed to be freed from the 
shackles of big government in order to fully realise his liberty. In the wake of this turn 
towards a political philosophy of anti-statist individualism the politics of class conflict 
were side-lined and became more or less redundant in the period following the end 
of the cold war, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Deng’s 
market reforms in China, and the emergence of the American-led end of history 
narrative. From the late 1980s onwards a fusion of Chicago style economics, or what 
Foucault (2008) called anarcho-capitalism, and German ordoliberalism, which seeks 
to manage and enable the free market, has dominated the global scene. It is in the 
context of this social, political, economic, and cultural condition, the subsequent 
history of neoliberal reform, and centrally high speed, high tech financialisation that 
the crash occurred, the crisis unfolded, and austerity has been imposed across 
Europe. In the next section of the article I intend the explore the psycho-politics of 
austerity in the European, and specifically, British context in order to suggest 
reasons why this approach to economic management has found mass appeal and in 
some cases increased support for right wing parties committed to welfare and public 
sector cuts. 
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II 
 
Thanatonomics and the Spectre of Neoliberalism 
 
While there has been a critical response to harsh austerity measures across Europe, 
and in particular in countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, I would suggest that 
this has been less apparent in Britain, where protest has been overshadowed by a 
post-political moral vision accepting of the ‘tough love’ of austerity that ultimately 
swept Cameron, Osborne, and the Conservative architects of the cuts agenda back 
into office in 2015. In this section of the article I want to examine the psycho-politics 
and cultural reception of austerity in Britain, especially under conditions of neoliberal 
capitalism’s celebration of excess and luxury. My objective in this discussion is to 
explore the appeal of austerity and seek to understand how first, the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition and second, the current Conservative government have 
been able to defend the idea of austerity and gain support for a programme of public 
sector cuts in a social context defined by class division, where widespread hardship, 
poverty, and misery very clearly rub up against extreme, excessive, ostentatious, 
and very conspicuous levels of consumption in particular sectors of society. My core 
thesis here is that the British appetite for austerity, despite the persistence of excess 
and luxury, is organised around a psycho-political moral desire for the austere life 
rooted in a response to the neoliberal principle of competition. While this economic 
principle is constructed in purely logical terms, so that competition ensures cost 
effectiveness, in practice the idea of capitalist struggle moralises around the 
protestant, puritan, division between the categories of the saved and damned 
outlined by Weber (2010) in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
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According to this logic, where I ensure my own salvation through capitalist success, 
the punishment of the other who is damned by austerity makes political sense 
because their destruction makes my salvation more likely. On the other side of this 
equation, there is also a sense in which austerity culture satisfies the kind of 
thanatological drive to escape the self set out by Freud (2003b) in his Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. In this classic work the founder of psychoanalysis explains that 
the oedipal self desires escape from the pain of individuation in a thanatological 
replay of the peace of life in utero. Underneath its commitment to cold, hard, 
instrumental reason I would suggest that the contemporary neoliberal economy 
pushes in this direction through on the one hand, flight into the thingness of absolute 
luxury, and on the other hand, the austere reduction of human life to its absolute 
base materialism – in both instances we confront the body that exists, but little more. 
Given this psychological condition, and the ways it has been made manifest in the 
neoliberal economy of extreme wealth and poverty, luxury and austerity, it is possible 
to see how the drive to compete, and moralise the destruction of the other in 
unsustainable levels of austerity which threatens their very existence, represents the 
sadistic projection or the other side of the basic masochism where I desire my own 
austere escape from the world of individuation, endless desire, and the suffocating 
blizzard of things that has come to define neoliberal consumer culture. 
 
On the basis of the above psycho-political analysis we might suggest that the appeal 
of, and indeed desire for austerity, in Britain can be understood in terms of the 
political tradition of liberalism, and its suspicion of the state, and also British 
theological history, centred around Protestantism and the thanatological dimensions 
of this belief system which revolve around the drive to escape from the 
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meaninglessness of material things. Of course, the paradox of this drive to overcome 
materiality in the name of a transcendental position closer to God is that the true 
believer becomes base material through their austere life when they reject every 
form of luxury and artifice. There is no more than bare metabolism in this view, which 
is, ironically, perfectly symmetrical with the neoliberal tendency towards instrumental 
rationality, economic metaphysics, and the theology of the bottom line. This shift 
from bare materiality, where economic metabolism is everything, to pure theological 
idealism, or spirituality is ensured by the dialectical reversal that takes place when 
the state of base materialism is realised which is precisely what Martin Luther 
understood in his original critique of Catholic ostentation. Ironically, base 
materialism, and closeness to death, opens up a direct line to the ideal, theological, 
universe of God. However, what the contemporary neoliberal political economic 
situation in Britain shows is that the Catholic approach to communion with God 
through fine things is equally operative in the post-modern consumer society where 
the truth of the post-crash settlement is an acceptance of uneven austerity where 
extreme poverty mixes with excessive wealth and luxury. In the context of uneven 
austerity the austere desire to escape materialism finds its complement in the 
equally extreme pursuit of luxury and fine things which has led London to become 
home to more billionaires than any other city in the world (Sunday Times Rich List, 
2014). On the surface, the world of the super-rich seem be concerned with the 
obsessive pursuit of material finery and absolutely devoid of any ideal dimension, but 
I would suggest that it is precisely this extreme materialism and absolute form of 
luxury that cancels in the emergence of base, or absurd, thingness, which ironically 
opens out onto a transcendental or, in Freudian language, oceanic space.  
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Akin to the practice of extreme austerity, which has gripped Europe, and been more 
or less accepted in Britain by a population that has re-elected the architects of the 
society of the cut, primarily because of a psycho-political predisposition to pursue an 
austere life towards death, my view is that the British live with the super-rich and 
their extreme consumption and ostentatious displays of luxury because ultimately 
their pursuit of fine things aims at the same post-material, transcendental, quasi-
theological conclusion. At this point it is important to emphasise that this drive is 
thanatological and quasi-theological because there is no sense in which this 
paradoxical drive to escape materialism through the material is in any sense 
religious or organised around an explicit religious ideology because Britain remains a 
largely secular society. On the contrary, I would suggest that this thanatological, 
quasi-theological, dimension is a kind of unconscious left-over which exists within the 
British national psyche and has come to define the social and political receipt and 
general acceptance of neoliberal economics, extreme inequality, and uneven 
austerity where some suffer and struggle to sustain their existence and others 
wallow in extreme and absurd luxury. My view is, therefore, that it is possible to find 
a spirit of neoliberal capitalism hidden within this thanatological, quasi-theological 
dimension that explains how this form of economics, or what we might call 
thanatonomics, continues to attract popular support in countries such as Britain in 
the context of extreme levels of inequality which have become more or less banal 
and no longer worth speaking about.  
 
I want to return to the banality of inequality and what I want to call the neoliberal 
resistance to social analysis later in my discussion, but I think it is worth emphasising 
here that the value of the exploration of the spirit of neoliberal capitalism is that it has 
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the potential to make sense of the problem of the apparent materiality, necessity, 
and post-political pragmatism of neoliberalism that conditions its economic realism 
and subsequently takes the ground of social and political critique. The problem with 
this realism for critical thinkers is, of course, that it enables the contemporary 
neoliberal elite to claim that their worldview is simply organised on the basis of 
economic rationality, that they have no partisan attachment to any political position 
beyond the one that seeks to organise fair and open competitive market relations, 
and that there is no real alternative to this position in a world where the more or less 
free market has been globalised. In many respects this view, which is outlined by 
Jamie Peck (2012) in his book, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, has been largely 
accepted by the left that has bought into the story of the post-ideological, post-
political, dimension of neoliberalism and has indeed started to follow the harsh, 
uneven, realism of the right and the capitalist elites. However, the problem with this 
acceptance is that it cuts off opposition, resistance, or alternatives before they have 
even been fully imagined with the result that the left becomes trapped within a state 
of self-imposed neoliberal reason, realism, and stupidity on the basis of what it 
mistakes for pure, instrumental, post-political rationality, simply because it can no 
longer identify the ideological roots of this form of capitalism. The reason this 
acceptance of hard economic reason, retreat towards self-imposed stupidity, and 
caution against the utopian imagination is a mistake is because what Peck calls 
neoliberal reason, and talks about in terms of a form of pragmatism, is not organised 
around a coherent political ideology which is it possible to oppose on the level of 
rational thought, but rather a deep unconscious, cultural, inheritance that operates 
through a form of psycho-political moralism that passes itself off as common sense 
precisely because of its unconscious, unspoken, status.  
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My sense is that it is possible to identify the presence of this psycho-political, moral, 
deep structure through its very absence in the work of the key critics of neoliberal 
reason such as Peck. In his book there is no neoliberal ideology, but only a form of 
highly adaptable pragmatism. In Peck’s view the core neoliberal idea, the free 
market, is never complete, but always in process, always under construction. In this 
respect the lack of a fully coherent neoliberal ideology is the very point of neoliberal 
ideology or what he calls neoliberal reason. However, the problem with this view is 
that its recognition of realism, pragmatism, and cognitive mobility entails a loss of 
coherence and in the end it is unclear what exactly animates or defines the 
neoliberal project in an overall sense. While Peck (2012) writes of neoliberal reason, 
my view is that we must look for the ur-principle of neoliberal capitalism in the 
unconscious, unreason, and the kind of thanatonomics that we find expressed in the 
contemporary political economy of on the one hand, austerity and deprivation, and 
on the other hand, luxury and excess, precisely because I think that the extreme 
materiality or objective necessity of the neoliberal project is what confirms its 
theological, ideal, or unreasonable basis. It is possible to find a comparable 
argument in Joseph Vogl’s (2014) work on the idealism of contemporary economy, 
The Specter of Capital, which exchanges Marx and Engels’ (2008) famous line about 
the spectre of communism for Don DeLillo’s (2011) reference to the spectre of 
capital which haunts the contemporary global financial system. For Vogl, capitalism 
has always been a spectral machine ever since Smith wrote about the invisible hand 
and imagined that some benevolent theological power oversaw the conversion of 
private vice into public benefit. Vogl calls the contemporary capitalist system an 
economic theodicy, or oikodicy to refer to the idea of God’s management of the 
household economy, but where he falls short in his exploration of the role of God in 
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the neoliberal global system is in his failure to examine the way this idea finds its 
place in the history of social and political thought and how this mode of thought 
emerged from a deeply religious cultural milieu – for example, Smith’s own 
theological belief and particularly his early interest in Protestantism which led him to 
imagine his economic God in the first place. Again, the value of this connection that 
leads back of Locke’s (2003) notion of God-given rights, and even further Hobbes’ 
(2008) biblical idea of the leviathan, is to extend the theory of the pure materialism 
and pragmatism of neoliberalism into a recognition of its spectral dimensions and 
beyond this towards an understanding of the ways in which this spectrality functions 
in the unconscious of those who accept, consume, and desire austerity on the basis 
of its promise of thanatonomic salvation.  
 
Understanding this thanatonomic identification is especially pertinent in the British 
case under consideration because of the historical position of the home of capitalism 
caught between the origins of the liberal tradition of Hobbes (2008), Locke (2003), 
and Smith (2012) and the birth of anti-capitalist resistance, class struggle, and 
modern communism in the works of Marx and Engels (2008). What recognition of 
this unconscious dimension explains is precisely how the liberal, laissez faire, 
position survived the long 20th century from the 1930s onwards and eventually came 
back by way of Chicago and Austria to take over in the 1970s and even more, 
endured the 2008 crash, crisis, and recession through the imposition of a new 
Victorianism upon the British population. However, I would suggest that exploration 
of the thanatonomic spirit which animates neoliberal capitalism is not simply a story 
of class defeat, but instead also opens up a space for thinking about the critical 
potential of this perspective where realisation of the stupid materiality of, and 
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unconscious drive behind, neoliberalism starts to haunt the economics of limitless 
desire and endless growth with the spectre of its own limitation in a vision of a new 
kind of economics, what Georges Bataille (1991) called general economy. Here, the 
stupid medium par excellence, money, no longer commands humans who come to 
understand that economy is useful, but not fundamental or essential in itself, for the 
fair distribution of goods across people who are no longer torn asunder by the pain of 
individuation, but recognise each other outside of the Darwinian logic of savage 
competition.  
 
Beyond Spencer’s (2009) vision of the survival of the fittest, which the English 
Victorian thinker coined in his Principles of Biology and which really should be seen 
as a key principle for understanding the conduct of neoliberal social relations, 
Bataille’s general economy stands outside of the economic second nature and 
presents the possibility for a new kind of humanism. Thus I want to suggest that 
neoliberal thanatonomics symbolises the extreme outer limit of capitalism and less 
death in itself than the death of a particular form of neoliberal subjectivity wedded to 
the extreme materialism of austerity, luxury, and the violence of economic 
survivalism. Moreover, I think that it is precisely because the current phase of 
neoliberalism seems to offer little choice between an austere future on the very edge 
of survival and a life of absurd excess, ridiculous ostentation, and meaningless 
luxury that the general economy - which is socialistic and takes into account the 
needs of humanity and human-being-in-the-world rather than mutilated economic 
individuals who think in terms of the costs and benefits through the lens of the 
medium of money - ranges into view and suggests the utopian possibility of the 
trans-individual who is simultaneously made in and through their interactions with 
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others and the world. But before it is possible to think about the emergence of 
Bataille’s (1991) general economy, which would entail the end of the misery of 
austerity and the absurdity of luxury in a reasonable society organised around a 
recognition of the truth of trans-individualism and an economic principle of equality, it 
will be necessary to overcome the moral position that we find in Smith (2012) and 
Weber (2010) where the austere self is a superior type who deserves everything 
they achieve and retake the space of critical thought that neoliberalism has very 
effectively colonised. In the case of Weber’s work on the protestant ethic the 
psychology of the austere capitalist, who saves and reinvests rather than spends 
and wastes, is taken to be evidence of this type’s moral superiority and this vision is 
employed in contemporary discourse around the deserving super-rich who somehow 
earn their money. From this point of view it is ironically the super-rich, wallowing in 
luxury, who are truly living in austerity and the poor who are lazy, wasteful, and 
ultimately undeserving. However, it is very difficult to support the idea that the 
contemporary neoliberal elites embody this austere, moral, approach of selfhood, 
simply because of their commitment to thanatonomic consumption practices. On the 
contrary, in the contemporary British context the critique of waste and wastefulness 
and the harsh medicine of austerity has been clearly reserved for the weakest 
members of society, including the poor, children, and the disabled, who are 
considered in need of reform in order to make them more productive in a situation 
where welfare is a waste of money.  
 
In light of this kind of political critique of the morality of contemporary austerity, and 
the ways it separates from what Weber had in mind, which becomes a justification 
for inequality on the basis that the economic elite are represented as morally 
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superior, I believe that it is possible to exchange the liberal, moral, vision of what we 
might call the spirit of neoliberal capitalism for a critical perspective that takes in the 
violence, misery, and injustice inspired by economic relations in contemporary 
Britain. The effect of this transition from a position where morality justifies the 
injustice of superiority and inferiority, wealth and poverty, and the imposition of 
uneven austerity in the context of exorbitant luxury to a critical perspective which 
recognises the violence of the contemporary social, political, economic, and cultural 
settlement is, in my view, to transform the spirit of neoliberal capitalism into its scary 
other, what I want to call the spectre of neoliberalism, that haunts the unjust society 
and points towards the possibility of some other approach to social life beyond the 
extremes of wealth and poverty of thanatonomics. When the spirit of neoliberal 
capitalism, which names the energy, attitude, and disposition that drives this 
ideological form into the future, becomes the spectre of the same economic form, the 
ghosts and ghouls of Marx and Engels’ (2008) vision of communism that haunted 
Victorian capitalism come back onto the scene and it becomes clear that the 
thanatonomic system is unsustainable. The reason for this is that the 20th century 
model of distributed growth imagined by Keynes (1965), which sustained capitalism 
in the period stretching from the 1930s through the 1970s, has been exchanged for a 
kind of Victorian growth that is uneven, poorly distributed, and does very little to 
tackle the socially divisive problem of inequality. In this situation, where the twin 
infinitives of austerity and luxury become the key reference points of capitalism, 
economics become thanatonomics and there is no way to defer antagonism into the 
future. Antagonism is now and there is no escape from the kind of social war 
Foucault (2004) spoke about in his seminar Society must be Defended and Virilio 
(2008) captures through his idea of pure war. In contemporary Britain the neoliberal 
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elite’s strategy has been to wage a more or less secret political war on the weakest 
in society and defend the 19th century vision of the moral spirit of capitalism. In this 
view the rich are deserving in spite of their very public excesses, while the poor are 
clearly sinful, lazy, wasteful, undeserving, even when their structural disadvantage is 
beyond doubt. 
 
What this illustrates is that beyond the ideology of post-politics, which suggests that 
neoliberalism is a form of rationality, reason, and realism, contemporary capitalism is 
really based in a deeply violent political, moral, economy that separates the moral 
from the immoral, the useful from the useless, the deserving from the undeserving, 
and the normal from the pathological. But explicit recognition of this political strategy, 
which transforms the weakest members of society into human waste, would clearly 
be a serious strategic mistake for the elites so the post-political utilitarian explanation 
takes over and it appears that there is no alternative to the kind of banal, objective, 
violence that destroys lives in the name of the post-human, ordoliberal, lie of 
economic balance. But I would suggest that it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
defend the Weberian vision of moral capitalism today, or even pretend that austerity 
is somehow evenly distributed, because this is clearly a class based project that 
excludes those who wallow in luxury who are strangely everywhere but nowhere in 
popular and academic discourse. Given this view it may be that it is better to try to 
understand the truth of neoliberal capitalism, or at least the truth of the neoliberal 
capitalist elites, through Werner Sombart’s (1967) work on the relationship between 
luxury and capitalism, which explains that the origins of capitalism reside in 
consumption, excess, and centrally sexual desire. On the basis of Sombart’s reading 
on luxurious capitalism, which coincidentally emerged in the early 20th century when 
24 
 
Freud was in the process of rethinking human psychology and the fundamental 
importance of the sex instinct, I think that it is possible to suggest that capitalism is 
essentially never about austerity, and reinvestment in the name of God, but rather its 
polar opposite – the potentially positive Freudian sex instinct or the transgressive, 
creative, power of Marx’s notion of species being expressed economically. Although 
Sombart is rarely connected to neoliberal capitalism, which has fallen in love with the 
idea of a kind of economic realism or rationality that conveniently locates it in a post-
political space, there is clearly a direct line from his work, and particularly books such 
as War and Capitalism, and the neoliberalism of, for example, Schumpeter (2010) 
who wrote about economic innovation, creative destruction, and the new that cannot 
be quantified, suddenly shifts everything, and makes a difference that matters. In this 
respect I would suggest that it is a mistake to accept the thinly veiled moral politics of 
contemporary capitalism, which explain that there is no alternative to the necessity of 
economic realism and the rejection of wastefulness, excess, and change, because 
neoliberal economics are themselves based in the idea that excess is what drives 
capitalism forward and opens a space onto the emergence of the new that is 
essential to the idea of modernity itself.  
 
But what Schumpeter (2010) or the other early neoliberals could not have foreseen 
or explored in their works where they opposed the freedom of entrepreneurialism to 
the bureaucratic tyranny and in some cases the outright totalitarianism of the state, 
was that the late capitalist neoliberal state would itself become the champion of a 
kind of economic totalitarianism organised around a brutally efficient, highly 
organised, system for the production of surplus value which leaves very little room 
for individual freedom in general. Of course, individual freedom remains on the 
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scene, because the contemporary thanatonomic system ensures some live lives 
characterised by a kind of hyper-individualism and hyper-freedom that threatens to 
cancel itself in its very lack of opposition, but there is little sense that this is in any 
way distributed through the social system precisely because the majority, and 
especially those deemed undeserving, worthless, and useless, must live under 
conditions of strict austerity which limits their ability to realise their formal freedom 
and even more, very consciously throws them into a state of nature where they must 
struggle to survive. Beyond the early 20th century pair of Weber (2010) and Sombart 
(1967), who capture the polar opposites of the austere and excessive capitalist 
modes of subjectivity, there is a sense in which it is possible to find the same tension 
in the works of three contemporary thinkers who have explored the idea of the spirit 
of capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello and Bernard Stiegler. In their work on 
the new spirit of capitalism, Boltanski and Chiapello (2006) show how neoliberalism 
capitalism emerged from the Keynesian settlement on the basis of a fear of the 
totalitarian state and its impacts upon individual freedom. For Boltanski and 
Chiapello the Keynesian state eventually responded to the general fear of 
totalitarianism, which found expression in events such as May 1968, by adopting a 
new stance on capitalism and market forces that eventually led to the emergence of 
the new creative capitalism. In this respect Boltanski and Chiapello update 
Sombart’s story, where capitalism is organised around its ability to harness, what we 
might call in Freudian terms, libidinal energy in order to produce innovation, 
development, and growth. However, the problem with this story is that it is 
incomplete because what we see in contemporary capitalism is the way in which this 
freedom of desire and expression is unevenly distributed through relations of 
production which ensure that some enjoy the freedom of what I have called above, 
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hyper-individualism, and others are constrained by the limits of austerity and state 
imposed austere subjectivity. This is the work of the new leviathan, the neo-
totalitarian, neoliberal, iron cage.  
 
Where Boltanski and Chiapello’s story is incomplete, therefore, is in its failure to 
recognise the other side of the neoliberal turn to individual freedom and away from 
state restriction. While the neoliberal turn reflected a shift in economic policy, and a 
move away from welfare statism, towards an idea of the free, creative, 
entrepreneurial self able to stand on their own two feet, it has also entailed the rise of 
a biopolitical punitive security state organised to police others and ensure that their 
behaviour follows the new individualistic regime of truth where the moral politics of 
austere subjectivity applies to those who are not in a position to buy exemption from 
its constraints. This is precisely what I would suggest a reading of Bernard Stiegler’s 
(2011, 2012, 2014) work on decadence, disbelief, and discredit can explain. In 
Stiegler’s work the neoliberal turn to economic individualism, which has translated 
the economics of desire, where I must wait for what I want, into the thanatonomics of 
drive, which entails the collapse of the period of deferral into a dense moment of 
meaningless satisfaction and despair where I want for nothing but also lose my 
reason for living, has led the state to move from an institution concerned with welfare 
to one organised around the need to police the fallout from the turn to 
thanatonomics. At this point it is important to understand the psychoanalysis of the 
emergence of thanatonomics because this enables recognition of the profound 
nature of this fall out. In Stiegler’s view the general problem with the end of the 
modern period of the deferral of desire, which results from an economic system that 
says ‘you may have what you want now’, even if this involves taking out 
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unsustainable credit, is that the entire symbolic order or cultural system which 
sustains subjectivity within a framework of norms, regulations, and prohibitions that 
limit and centrally enable civilized behaviour starts to break down. For Stiegler, the 
result of this breakdown is the emergence of a new kind of society, where there is no 
future because the very idea of the future relies on a notion of deferral organised 
through symbolic structures of prohibition and proscription, which represents the 
social-psychological dimension of Fukuyama’s (1992) vision of the geo-political end 
of history.  
 
Living through the end of history, Stiegler’s (2011, 2012, 2014) de-subjectified 
subject, who we can only call a subject negatively because the rules this new person 
obeys are rules about the end of limits, is the fleshed out psychoanalytic explanation 
of Fukuyama’s last man. While true freedom resides in an appreciation of limits, the 
last man’s freedom no longer recognises prohibition. In this respect his freedom is 
properly thanatonomic in that it revolves around a utopian, but also centrally 
dystopian, sense of the end of the future that means that nothing is possible, in the 
sense that meaningful change has become impossible, but everything is permitted, 
since there is no prohibition on behaviour that assumes its own meaninglessness. It 
is under these economic conditions, which have resulted in the collapse of normal, 
oedipal, subjectivity where individuals recognise limits, that the state has adopted a 
new role centred around neo-totalitarian bio-political control. In the Keynesian period 
from the end of World War II to the late 1970s this was never necessary because 
subjective limits could be assumed and the state could encourage spending in order 
to stimulate growth and centrally redistribution across society. However, under 
conditions of neoliberalism, where the subject has been fully emancipated from the 
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very constraints that once defined its identity, there is no need to encourage 
spending, because the new de-subjectified subject will consume until its very end, 
and redistribution makes no sense because the wider social, symbolic, cultural 
structures that made the idea of a society make sense no longer hold. In this 
situation, the only possible function for the state in the wake of crash, which was the 
result of the madness of the financial elites who behaved with complete de-
subjectified abandon, is to maintain some kind of order within the parameters of the 
neoliberal thanatonomic system, where people are entirely free of social 
responsibility. This means that there is no real recognition of moral or social 
responsibility for the crash, but only a class based discourse that explains that the 
problem resides, and has always resided in the exorbitant cost of the social 
structures that make it possible to understand morality and responsibility in the first 
place.            
 
In the context of the neoliberal ideological framework that no longer recognises 
social responsibility, but is on the contrary allergic to the very suggestion of social 
interdependence, the moralism that emerged in the wake of the crash was never 
about over-consumption in itself, but rather reliance on the social, welfare, state. This 
is why austerity, and the project to reconstruct an austere self, is coloured by 
neoliberal extremism, and thanatonomics, in that the drive to restrict the new self is 
in a sense unrestricted, and excessive in that it assumes that limits are potentially 
limitless. Since there are no prohibitions on how far the austere individual can be 
pushed in the name of the reduction of their material burden on others, the drive to 
austerity becomes a quasi-theological project in that its opposition to material costs 
eventually lapses into a kind of transcendental idealism, or vision of mystical 
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perfection, where everything becomes perfectly symmetrical, but also, most 
importantly, subsumed in everything else. It is precisely here, at the extreme edge of 
neoliberal economics, or what I have sought to call thanatonomics, that I think we 
enter the space of Bataille’s general economics beyond neoliberal moralism. While 
Bataille’s central focus in his key works on general economy, The Accursed Share 
(1991), is luxury, and the ways in which the luxurious transgresses the material for a 
kind of transcendental, oceanic, space, I would argue that historically, and in the 
contemporary politics of austerity, the austere aims at the same target, which is the 
escape from the banal world of things for a more meaningful universe which 
recognises the profound interaction between everybody and everything.  
 
However, it is, paradoxically, precisely this universe, the universe of the general 
economy that contemporary neoliberalism seeks to deny through first, its obsession 
with the meaninglessness of restricted economic realism, rationalism, and 
pragmatism, and second, its insistence on both methodological and moral 
individualism, where the individual is practically limited in terms of what they can 
know, the rights they can claim, and responsibilities they are expected to fulfil. But it 
is essentially because of this desperate denial of general economics in the name of 
restricted economics, particularly in a period where the ecology of human and world 
has become clear, that it has become impossible to ignore the general economic 
truth that interactions between humans cannot be reduced to the basic exchange of 
money. That is to say that the barely contained truth of the contemporary neoliberal 
condition, which has been repressed in the symptomatic emergence of a horrendous 
situation where some live in absolute luxury and others struggle to survive in a state 
of austerity that makes life scarcely liveable, is that the human condition is defined 
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by what Gilbert Simondon (Combes, 2012) called trans-individualism, that this state 
of radical interdependence stretches back across the generations to define our past, 
present, and possible futures, and that it is impossible to live without the debt that 
contemporary economics seeks to deny, but which is in reality, a necessity of 
existence itself. Given that it is impossible for the individual to ever repay their debt 
to others and the world itself, simply because credit and debt define existence which 
is always in a state of becoming, it may be the case that neoliberalism represents the 
most naïve, unrealistic, and unreasonable economic form it is possible to imagine. If 
this is the case, perhaps the origins of this mode of thinking are less concerned with 
pragmatism, and more bound up with the ancient, tragic, tradition where the 
individual refuses their relationship to the world in the name of the escape from 
necessity into the realm of the Gods. In light of this perhaps it is the tragic wisdom of 
the ancients that has been lost in the rebellious hubris of neoliberal capitalism that 
imagines the utopian individual out on his own beyond relations to others and world. 
Perhaps it is this hubris, and this desperate belief in the omnipotence of the capitalist 
individual, that the left needs to correct today by exploding the myth that denies the 
necessity of interdependence of self, other, and world. In the final section of this 
article I want to conclude in an exploration of what I want to call the resistance to 
social analysis which I would suggest has come to define the neoliberal period and 
resulted in the foreclosure of this general economic truth. My argument here is that it 
is possible to trace this refusal of social, or to use Simondon’s term trans-individual, 
truth back to the origins of liberalism, and then later, neoliberalism and that these 
points represent traumatic moments, and potentially social, political, economic, and 
cultural catastrophes, which we must work through in the proper psychoanalytic 
significance of the idea of ‘working through’ in order to make the leap beyond 
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contemporary thanatonomics into the sustainable world of general economics where 
the relation of self, other, and world is understood as necessary and irreducible. 
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III 
 
The Trauma of Neo/Liberalism 
 
In order to move beyond the twin infinitives of austerity and luxury, which have come 
to define neoliberal thanatonomics and the common sense market fundamentalism 
that makes extreme inequality appear acceptable, my view is that the left must look 
to oppose what I want to call the ‘resistance to social analysis’ that comprises the 
contemporary post-political milieu where economic violence is understood in terms of 
realism, rationalism, and pragmatism and any sense of social responsibility is 
considered leftist or Marxist madness. In the most basic sense I would suggest that 
this resistance to social thought, analysis, and critique finds its basis in the rise of 
individualism, the collapse of the mainstream left in countries such as Britain, and 
more profoundly the failure of the very social, symbolic, cultural structures that make 
sociological understandings possible. In this context my use of the idea of the 
resistance to social analysis has very particular significance which relates to the 
psychoanalytic notion of the resistance to psychoanalysis that explains that 
analysands will tend to resist psychoanalysis, and centrally psychoanalytic truths, 
precisely because these threaten to unearth repressed, traumatic, contents that the 
subject cannot accept because these will undermine the very basis of their 
subjectivity (Freud, 2003a). Thus the subject of psychoanalysis will tend to find 
psychoanalytic truths absolutely untrue and absolutely ridiculous precisely because 
these repressed contents represent the very negative foundations of their 
subjectivity. Given this theory, my thesis is that it is possible to find a similar, social 
and political form of resistance to critique inherent in the contemporary neoliberal 
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post-political commitment to economic reason and that it is this resistance that the 
left must oppose or resist if it is to ever construct a viable politics committed to social 
equality and justice that does not crash upon the rocks of the neoliberal idea of hard 
economic rationality. In psychoanalysis resistance to analysis represents a defence 
mechanism against traumatic contents that must be first, uncovered and second, 
worked through in order to enable the subject to accept its past and centrally move 
forward into the future free of the endless repetitious effort to resolve the unbearable 
traumas that are already lost to its past. Regarding the contemporary social and 
political problem of neoliberalism, and its deep resistance to social analysis that has 
come to infect the social body that accepts hyper-division and hyper-inequality, my 
view is that it is possible to identify two key traumatic moments, relating to first, the 
modern break with the ancients, and second, the post-modern break with the 
moderns, which must be worked through in order to open out onto a kind of post-
post-modern space beyond the capitalist fantasy of the completely independent man 
from nowhere. 
 
In the first instance I want to suggest that it is possible to turn to the modern father of 
austerity, John Locke, and particularly his discovery of the world as private property. 
Here, my suggestion is that Locke’s (2003) philosophical innovation around private 
property represented a traumatic moment in social, political, and economic history on 
the basis that what he achieved was a radical break from the ancient theory of the 
relationship between man and world where the human attempt to escape from the 
environment had always been thought through in terms of tragedy and failure. 
Against this tragic vision which we find everywhere in the ancient world, Locke took 
seriously the possibility of man’s escape from the world that subsequently becomes 
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his property. Once this initial break had taken place, and the world had been 
transformed into an economic object, it was also possible for man to take himself for 
his own property, and understand the other as a potentially dangerous stranger who 
could threaten this form of possessive individualism. Thus the state emerges in order 
to defend man’s right to own the world and himself from others who may seek to 
infringe these rights. Of course, from Marx’s (1988) point of view, this freedom is no 
freedom worthy of the name, but rather represents the alienation of humanity from 
self, others, and world that comprise our essential species being. Despite this early 
philosophical critique which we find in Marx’s 1848 Manuscripts, unfortunately what 
the left managed to oppose in the new capitalist system was the material inequality 
between people, and it is this that Keynes (1965) managed to address in his theory 
of the state management of the economy. While Smith (2012) sought to place the 
burden of ethical responsibility onto the benevolent invisible hand, Keynes saw that 
the state must manage economy and produce growth in order to emancipate people 
from need and create a situation where it would be possible to live outside of the 
necessity of money. Although the leftist response to the original modern liberal break 
with the ancients was, therefore, concerned to address the problem of inequality, I 
would suggest that it failed to respond to the original traumatic event, which saw self, 
other, the world torn asunder and transformed into independent economic actors 
who then need to be made equal. It was only on the basis of the persistence of this 
condition of estrangement which resulted from the original trauma that Hayek and 
the neoliberals were able to respond to the threat of what they saw as the 
totalitarianism implicit in Keynesianism and eventually produce what I would suggest 
represented the post-modern trauma of neoliberalism that further emancipated the 
self from other and destroyed any sense of community and social responsibility in a 
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new consumer society where the individual is thought to be absolutely self-contained 
and beyond the influence of self and world.  
 
In the British case this post-modern situation has been operative from Margaret 
Thatcher’s period in office, through the Blair / Brown New Labour years, and the 
current Cameron / May era of harsh cuts and austerity. While Thatcher sought to 
emancipate the self from community, and in particular destroy the working class 
sense of social responsibility and unionism which had become a break on 
profitability, the Blair / Brown period of government was defined by what Anthony 
Giddens (1998) called the third way, which named the attempt to reconcile rampant 
individualism with social welfare, and the catastrophic market crash of 2008. It is this 
situation that Cameron inherited first, in office with the Liberal Democrats and 
second, in the current Conservative government, and has sought to resolve through 
the destruction of the welfare state through austerity. As such, Cameron sought to 
reconstruct the minimal state imagined by Locke, which was only ever necessary to 
protect private property, and recreate a Victorian style class system, where the poor 
must struggle to survive and the rich are free to consume without limits, on the basis 
this that is morally right inside the neoliberal universe where the truth of sociability is 
repressed. However, in much the same way that the system that emerged from 
Locke’s (2003) work on private property, the 19th century version of laissez faire 
capitalism, produced Marx’s (1988) philosophical critique of estrangement and the 
mutilation of humanity, my view is that the polar opposition of contemporary 
neoliberal society defined by what I have called the thanatonomics of austerity and 
luxury will eventually produce a new idealism, or transcendental materialism, 
organised around recognition of the interdependence of self, other, and world. I have 
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sought to explain this shift in thought, which essentially describes the telescoping of 
post-modern and ancient philosophy, through reference to Georges Bataille’s work, 
The Accursed Share (1991), and his theory of the general economy where 
estrangement collapses into a new state of intimacy and what he calls continuous 
being. Although this new economics will have to struggle against the contemporary 
neoliberal resistance to social analysis, which is set on the maintenance of the status 
quo, my sense is that this deeply repressive approach to the defence of the idea of 
the free floating individual will not be able to survive the austere future that 
condemns some to barely liveable lives and others to excessive, meaningless, 
luxury, because extreme levels of inequality will generate the spectral other of this 
system, the spectre of neoliberalism. In the face of this unsustainable situation that 
rejects the necessary relationship of self, other, and world, the spectre of 
neoliberalism, or perhaps more precisely the spectre of the end of neoliberalism, that 
haunts the social, political, and economic system will eventually mean that there is 
no choice but to confront and work through the historical traumas of modern and 
post-modern capitalism. 
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